We use an agent-based model to analyze the effects of spatial heterogeneity and agents' mobility 16 on social-ecological outcomes. Our model is a stylized representation of a dynamic population of 17 agents moving and harvesting a renewable resource. Cooperators (agents who harvest an amount 18 close to the maximum sustainable yield) and selfish agents (those who harvest an amount greater 19 than the sustainable yield) are simulated in the model. Three indicators of the outcomes of the 20 system are analyzed: the number of settlements, the resource level, and the proportion of 21 cooperators in the population. Our paper adds a more realistic approach to previous studies on 22 the evolution of cooperation by considering a social-ecological system in which agents move in a 23 landscape to harvest a renewable resource. Our results conclude that resource dynamics play an 24 important role when studying levels of cooperation and resource use. Our simulations show that 25 the agents' mobility significantly affects the outcomes of the system. This response is nonlinear 26 and very sensible to the type of spatial distribution of the resource richness. In our simulations, 27 better outcomes of long-term sustainability of the resource are obtained with moderate agent 28 mobility and cooperation is enhanced in harsh environments with low resource level in which 29 cooperative groups have natural boundaries fostered by agents' low mobility. 30 31
INTRODUCTION 8 9
This paper is concerned with the interlinked effect of mobility and spatial heterogeneity on the 10 performance of social-ecological systems. Scholars have previously highlighted the effects of 11 mobility and spatial structure on social dilemmas outcomes (e.g., prisoner dilemma game) and 12 the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Nowak and May, 1992; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004) . For more 13 realistic approaches, however, it is important to take spatial dynamics into account in order to 14 have a social-ecological perspective. Here, we develop an agent-based model to add a complex 15 spatial setting to previous spatial social-dilemma models by including resource dynamics, in the 16 form of a renewable resource, instead of the payoff matrix of social dilemma games. In doing so, 17 we aim to analyze the levels of resource use, population growth, and cooperation in social-18 ecological systems. 19 
20
The cellular automaton developed by Nowak and May (1992) , in which agents interact with their 21 neighbors in a two-dimensional spatial array, was the first attempt to include spatial structure in 22 social dilemma games. In their model, Nowak and May found that spatial structure promotes 23 cooperation by forming clusters and thereby reducing exploitation by defectors, in contrast with 24 the spatially unstructured game, where defection is always favored. Subsequent studies also 25
showed that limiting the interactions to local neighbors generally promotes the evolution andpersistence of cooperation (Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998; Killingback, 1999) . Under certain 1 conditions, however, spatially structured games can be detrimental, like snowdrift-type 2 interactions (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Hauert, 2006) . The importance of the connectivity 3 structure to understand the levels of cooperative behaviors has been demonstrated in a wide 4 variety of agent-based models (for a review see Szabó and Fáth, 2007) . In addition to the spatial 5 structure, the ability of individuals to move on the lattice enhanced cooperation compared to no 6 mobile agents (e.g., Houston, 1993 We use an agent-based model to simulate a stylized representation of a dynamic population of 5 cooperative and selfish agents moving and harvesting a renewable resource. By mobility we refer 6 to the extent to which agents can move, which is related to the amount of information agents 7 have about the system. Cooperative agents harvest an amount of resource close to the maximum 8 sustainable yield while selfish agents may harvest an amount over the sustainable yield. Our 9 main contribution to the study of the evolution of cooperation is to allow selfish and cooperative 10 agents to harvest a renewable resource instead of the payoff matrix typically used in social 11 dilemmas. The individual characteristics and behavior of agents determine the sustainable use or 12 overexploitation of the resource. We analyzed the system's outcomes (resource, agents' 13 occupational level, and cooperation) under several scenarios in which we vary the mobility of the 14 agents and the landscape configuration (from homogeneous to very heterogeneous landscape). 
2.1.Model description 21 22
The model is a stylized representation of a common-pool resource which is appropriated by a 1 dynamic population of cooperative and selfish agents. The environment in which agents can 2 move around and harvest is a renewable resource in a landscape of 50 x 50 cells (Fig. 1) . Each 3 time step, agents make decisions on movement, harvesting, storage of energy, and may 4 reproduce or die. The agents can also imitate other agents' attributes if other agents are observed 5 to be doing better (Fig. 2) . Parameters and variables in the model represent units of energy. Where R j is the resource level at patch j, H j is the total resource harvested at patch j, r is the 10 resource growth rate, and K j is the carrying capacity of the resource at patch j. 11
12
Each patch might have from 0 to n agents ( 
8
Where met is the energy spent in the metabolism. Agents vary in the amount they desired to 9 harvest above the metabolism rate. The parameter S i is between 0 and 1 so that the agent will 10 meet the strict metabolism value with S i = 0, or a maximum of double the metabolism rate with 11 S i = 1. H D , met, and S represent units of energy. 12
13
With a certain probability (p c ), defined as a model parameter, agents who harvest more than x S 14 are caught and pay a penalty fee (F i ). 15
The value of F i is 0 if agent i is not caught or harvests an amount equal or less than x S . Thus, p c 18 affects the amount of energy storage by the cheater. As we will describe later, this affects the 19 reproduction capacity of these agents. 
2.2.Model experiments 14 15
The dynamics of the model are explored by a series of experiments in which we vary the 16 mobility of agents and the landscape structure. We ran 100 iterations for each experiment and 17 each simulation runs for a period of 5000 time steps. Early exploration of our model revealed 18 that around 100 simulations are necessary to reduce the variability of our statistics to an 19 acceptable level. We used as indicators the average of settlements (i.e., percentage of occupied 20 patches by at least one agent), resource levels, and proportion of cooperative agents in the 21 population, over the 100 iterations during the last 1000 time steps. Previous simulations showed 22 a high correlation between settlements and population level (i.e., number of agents), thus we 23 used the number of settlements as an indicator of the outcome of the simulation instead of 1 population (i.e., number of agents) because its value is comparable among different resource 2 richness distributions. Fig. 4 shows the high correlation between population and settlements. 3 4
Mobility 5 6
To analyze how the mobility of agents affects the indicators, we compared the results when we 7 ran the model for different move capacities of the agents. Move capacity (ar max ) is the size of the 8 radius that defined the possible set of patches an agent can move to. We ran the model for an 9 ar max of one, five, and 25. One means that agents can move to the neighboring patches, while a 10 move capacity of 25 means that agents can move to any patch of the system. Previous 11 simulations with move capacities of three and ten indicated linear relationship between one-12 three-five and between five-ten-25. 13 14
Landscape structure 15
16 We run our model for different landscape configurations, i.e., differences in the carrying capacity 17 (K) of the resource between patches. We considered four different statistical distributions of K: 18 homogeneous, uniform, normal, and exponential. In the homogeneous landscape, all patches are 19 settled to the same K. To settle the rest of the landscape configurations, we first assigned a value 20 to each cell according to a uniform, normal or exponential distribution. Then, we grouped the 21 resulting values in five equal intervals. Finally, we assigned to these categories of cells a 22 specific value of very low, low, medium, high and very high K. To compare outcomes betweenlandscapes configuration, we adjust these values so the total amount of resource on the entire 1 landscape remains the same for the four landscape configurations (Fig. 3) . We imported those 2 results from the R statistical package (R Development Core Team, 2008) using the NetLogo 3 extension r (Thiele and Grimm, 2010). 4 5
2.3.Sensitivity analysis 6 7
In the sensitivity analysis we varied the values of parameters from low to high values (Table 1)  8 and ran the simulations for the different distribution of the resource richness considered. In 9 particular, we varied the values of i) the probability of agents copying (I a ), ii) the probability of 10 catching a cheater (p c ) and iii) the size of the lattice (W) ( Table 1) . We use as indicator the 11 average occupied patches, resource level, and number of cooperators over the last 1000 time 12 steps of the 100 runs. We compared these results with results of the default models. In heterogeneous landscapes, lower occupation (i.e., number of settlements) and resource levels 7 are obtained with high move capacity (ar max = 25). With the same resource level, a low (ar max = 8 1) and moderate (ar max = 5) move capacity are able to support higher occupation levels in all the 9 landscape configurations (Figs. 6 and 7) . The highest percentage of occupied patches is obtained 10 with a move capacity of five (Fig. 7) . The resource level decreases as the move capacity of 11 agents increases for all landscape configurations except for the homogeneous landscape, which 12 ended with slightly higher levels of resource with a move capacity of 25 than with a move 13 capacity of five (Fig. 7) . 14 15
Low move capacity of agents ended with a low percentage of occupied patches and high 16 resource level, meaning that agents are not able to reach potential expansion areas (Fig. 7) . 17
Under this condition, cooperative agents persist more than selfish agents. The highest proportion 18 of cooperators in the population is obtained with a move capacity of one. The less cooperative 19 population is obtained with a move capacity of five (Fig. 7) . Low mobile agents need to adapt to 20 the local conditions since they have less chances to get to high resources patches. As move 21 capacity of the agents increases, cooperation decreases. However, higher levels of cooperators do 22 lead to higher resource levels and lower number of settlements. Since cooperative agents don'toverharvest they can only move around the landscape in a sustainable manner if the resource 1 levels remain high giving them sufficient extra sustainable harvest to pay for the movement 2 costs. A higher population pressure will reduce the ability of cooperators to pay for its mobility. 3 4
Figs. 9 and 10 show the value of the evolved parameters for different richness values of the 5 patches (k) when the resource is uniformly distributed in the landscape. With a move capacity of 6 one and five, agents select to settle in patches with high k value (k > 3). With a move capacity of 7 five, the occupation level of those patches is close to 100%, while with a move capacity of one, 8 the limited information of agents makes it more difficult for them to reach the best patches. 9
However, with a move capacity of 25, patches with high k value (k > 3) had significantly lower 10 levels of resource and occupation than patches with smaller k value. Agents with full information 11 tend to move to patches with very high k value, hence those patches have lower stability because 12 of overcrowding and overexploitation of local resources. On the contrary, patches with small 13 values of k are more sustainable because they don't attract many agents. As 
3.2.The effect of landscape heterogeneity 21
As we will show below, the effect of landscape configuration on the evolved value of 1 cooperation and resource levels highly depend on the combined effect of landscape and the move 2 capacity of the agents (Fig. 8) . In general, we observe that uniform and normal distributions of 3 resource richness ended in the higher level of settlements but moderate levels of resource (Figs. 6  4 and 8). In addition, the effect of landscape configuration on cooperation levels is, although 5 statistically significant, not as important as in the rest of indicators (Figs. 6 and 8) . In general, 6
higher cooperation levels are obtained in homogeneous or exponential landscapes when the 7 move capacity of the agents is high or moderate. In contrast, cooperation decreases as landscape 8 heterogeneity decreases when the move capacity of the agents is low (Figs. 5 and 8, see below). 9 Fig. 11 shows that the number of occupied patches increases as the 21 resource does but higher resource levels do not lead to higher levels of cooperation. In addition, 22 cooperation increases as the settlements decreases. 23 1 When the move capacity of the agents is high, the effect of landscape configuration decreases 2 (Fig. 11) . As shown in Fig. 11 , the value of the evolved variables when agents have a high move 3 capacity is more similar than when the move capacity decreases. Although statistically different 4 (Fig. 8) , when agents have a high move capacity, the effect of landscape heterogeneity on the 5 occupational level is not as important as it is with a low, and especially with a moderate move 6 capacity. With low or moderate move capacity of agents, landscapes with moderate resource 7 distribution heterogeneity (uniform and normal) leads to a higher occupational level (Figs. 6 and 8 8). Also, the percentage of cooperators in the population is the same for all the landscape 9 configurations but slightly lower for the uniform distribution of the resource (Fig. 8) . 10 11 In general, uniform and normal distributions ended in similar results (Fig. 11) . With these 12 landscape configurations, the best relationship between settlement and resource is obtained. 13
Move capacity of one leads to a high variability of results, even with situations of very high 14 resources and very low settlements (Fig. 11) 
3.4.Sensitivity analysis 18 19
We found that an increase in the frequency of imitation of agents (I a ) has a negative effect on the 20 outcomes of the model (Table 2) . For all landscape configurations, when I a increases the number 21 of occupied patches, the resource level and the proportion of cooperators in the population 22 decreases (Student's t-test; p < 0.001). On the contrary, a change in the probability of catching a 23 cheater (p c ) has positive consequences on the outcomes of the system (Table 2 ). In all landscape 1 configurations, if the value of p c is increased, then the number of settlements, the resource level 2 and the proportion of cooperators in the population increases (Student's t-test; p < 0.001). 3
Finally, an increase in the lattice size (W) has a significant effect on the outcomes of the system 4 (Student's t-test; p < 0.001) ( Table 2) . If the value of W is increased, then the number of 5 settlements increases in the exponential distribution, while the resource level increases in the 6 uniform distribution. Also, when W increases, cooperation also increases for all the landscape 7 configurations but for the homogeneous distribution of the resource. The relationship between 8 resource level and landscape configuration is the same for both lattice size. However, when the 9 value of W is increased, the number of settlements and cooperators are higher in the exponential 10 and normal or uniform distribution of the resource and not in the homogeneous distribution as in 11 the default model. Higher population increases allowed by a larger landscape, causes the 12 depletion of the resource in the homogeneous distribution of the resource. Better outcomes in the 13 heterogeneous distribution are obtained because population is able to stabilize since isolated 14 settlements with cooperative solutions can persist. 15 16 17
CONCLUSIONS 18 19
We developed a stylized model of a social-ecological systems composed of agents moving in a 20 variety of landscapes. Our purpose was to analyze the effects of mobility and landscape 21 heterogeneity in a set of social-ecological indicators (i.e., agents' occupational level, resource 22 level, and proportion of cooperators in the population). Our paper adds a more realistic approachto previous studies on the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Nowak and May, 1992) by considering 1 a social-ecological system in which agents move in a heterogeneous landscape to harvest a 2 renewable resource instead of the payoff matrix of social dilemma games. 3 4
We observe that the effect of both parameters (mobility and landscape heterogeneity) is highly 5 intertwined. Therefore, the effect of landscape configuration on the evolved value of cooperation 6 and population and resource levels is highly dependent on the combined effect of the landscape 7 and the move capacity of the agents. Earlier studies with static social dilemma games showed 8 that spatial structure increases cooperation in the prisoner dilemma game (Nowak and May, 9 1992) but inhibits cooperation in the snowdrift game (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Hauert, 2006) . 10
In accordance with previous studies of dynamic payoffs (Szabó and Fáth, 2007), we found that 11 natural resource dynamics have an important role in explaining levels of cooperation and 12 resource use in social-ecological systems. 13
14
Our model shows that, in general, moderate agent mobility originated the best relation between 15 settlements and resource, i.e., both high resource and high occupational levels are obtained. 16
However, the resulting presence of cooperators in the population is low. Previous studies have 17
shown a positive impact of resource adversity on cooperation due to resource unpredictability 18 (Andras et al., 2007) . In our simulations, cooperation is enhanced in harsh environments (i.e. low 19 resource level) in which cooperative groups have natural boundaries fostered by agents' low 20 mobility. Specifically, higher level of cooperation is obtained with low or high mobility and with 21 homogeneous landscapes or in landscapes with an exponential distribution of resource richness. 22
Low mobility makes population more cooperative but the low mobility leaves agents unable toexpand to new rich areas, making the evolved resource level very high but the occupational level 1 very low. Intermediate levels of cooperators are obtained with a high move capacity but the 2 resource level is low compared with a moderate occupation level. This high move capacity is 3 more threatening for the richest areas. Poorer areas were more sustainable because they didn't 4 attract many agents. As a consequence, the resulting agents' distribution was opposite of the 5 expected ideal free distribution (Fretwell, 1972) and rich areas ended with lower resource levels 6 due to the less sustainable behavior of agents. This selection process and differential agent 7 behavior among resource conditions can lead to spatial pattern formation (Smaldino, 2013). 
